

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

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(3) Attitude and Morale

(a) Soviet Union. The morale of the Soviet people would not become a decisive consideration to the Kremlin until such time as a drastic deterioration of the Soviet military position took place. While certain elements of the Soviet population, particularly ethnic groups in the Baltic states, Ukraine, the Caucasus and Central Asia, are dissatisfied with Soviet rule and hostile to domination by the Great Russians, the Soviet Government, through its efficient security police network, would be able to keep these groups under effective control in the early stages of the war. The more protracted the war, the more chance there would be for these subversive influences, already present in the Soviet Union, to manifest themselves and take a more active part in interfering with the Soviet war effort. Effective resistance of uprisings could be expected to occur only when the Western Allies are able to give material support and leadership, and assure the dissident elements early liberation from the Soviet yoke.

Soviet patriotism, while less ardent in support of a foreign war than in defense of home territory, would not be greatly shaken as long as military victories and war booty were forthcoming. As hostilities progressed, however, and if Soviet military reverses become known within the USSR, the increased hardships and suffering would magnify the already extensive popular dissatisfaction with the regime.

The one-time healthy respect of the Soviet citizen for American technical and industrial ingenuity, however, would by 1956 have been somewhat counteracted by propaganda designed to eulogize Soviet technique.

The people of the USSR are very susceptible to psychological warfare. The Soviet Union's most significant weakness in this regard is its policy of keeping its people in complete ignorance of the true conditions both inside and outside the USSR.

Psychological warfare, therefore, can be an extremely important weapon in promoting dissension and defection among the Soviet people, undermining their morale, and creating confusion and disorganization within the country. It could be particularly effective in subversive operations directed toward those ethnic groups which would welcome US liberation, as well as toward the Soviet Army, especially those elements of it which would be stationed outside the borders of the USSR.

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The most effective means of a psychological warfare effort directed against the Soviet Union would be that the Western Powers are not fighting against the peoples of the USSR, but only against the Soviet regime and its policies of enslavement and exploitation.

(b) Satellite States. Although the majority of the native populations in the satellite countries will still be intensely nationalistic, resenting Moscow domination and Communist rule, the continuation of heavy Soviet and Communist propaganda will have achieved a measure of effect at least upon the young people, specifically the generation which has been under ideological pressure for ten of their most important formative years. Nationalism will still be a source of great potential weakness to the Soviet Union, nevertheless, particularly so if shrewdly exploited by the West; but it would not give rise to effective resistance movements immediately upon the outbreak of hostilities. While it is possible that the dominant attitude among the satellite populations would be one of lessened cooperation and perhaps even of passive resistance toward their Communist masters, actual impediment of agricultural, industrial, and military contributions of the satellites to the Soviets' war effort will be of minor significance since the Kremlin will have strengthened its control to the utmost degree. For the same reason, effective resistance in the form of organized sabotage and guerrilla activities would be unlikely unless guidance and support from the West could be made available and the Soviet armies had suffered major reverses. The peoples of the satellite areas will still remain susceptible to psychological appeals in support of their aspirations for national independence, however, particularly if evidence of aid from the West is given.

(4) Subversive Organizations

(a) USSR. With the exception of scattered remnants in the Ukraine and the Baltic states, there would be no subversive organizations within the borders of the USSR. The Ukrainian Partisan Army (UPA) would have had its effectiveness and numbers considerably reduced by Soviet countermeasures.

In the initial stages of hostilities these vestigial movements, or other subversive organizations which might spring up, would not materially affect Soviet war capabilities. As the war progressed favorably for the Western Powers, however, and coordinated Allied material help and guidance were extended to these groups, they might be expected to assume more active roles in sabotage, propaganda, and resistance activities directed against the Soviet war effort.

(b) Satellite States. There are, in most of the satellite states, underground groups organized for the purpose of resisting Communist domination. These groups have been the object of relentless campaigns by Soviet and Communist security forces, and it is doubtful if they are presently capable of more than isolated acts of sabotage and harassment. Therefore, their existence would, in the event of war, impose not-too-heavy burdens upon the Communist security machinery so long as Western help is unavailable.

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Plans for dealing with resistance movements will have been made in advance, and the power of the security organizations will be such as to hold resistance activities to a minimum.

(5) Conclusions of Strategic Significance. The significant political strengths and weaknesses of the Soviet orbit are estimated to be as follows:

(a) Strengths.

I. The native courage, stamina, and patriotism of the Soviet people.

II. The elaborate and ruthless machinery by which the Kremlin exercises centralized political control throughout the Soviet orbit, employing police forces propaganda, and economic and political duress.

III. The ideological appeal of theoretical Communism.

IV. The psychological effect on the Soviet citizen of the concept of Soviet superiority over the West.

(b) Weaknesses.

I. Popular disillusionment and embitterment among the masses throughout the Soviet orbit, resulting from ruthless Soviet and Communist oppression and exploitation.

II. The instinctive fear, pervading all elements of Soviet and satellite society, which tends to destroy independent thinking and paralyze initiative.

III. The respect of many Soviet and satellite people for US technical progress, and the traditional sympathy of satellite peoples for Western democracy.

IV. The nationalism of the satellite populations including Communist elements, and of certain ethnic groups in the USSR.

V. Probable demoralization which would result from foreign military and occupation duties.

It is estimated that the strengths noted above constitute an actual and present advantage to the USSR, while the weaknesses, in most cases, are potential rather than actual. During the early stages of conflict, the above-mentioned weaknesses would constitute a substantial burden upon the Soviet Union's machinery for political control, and would also impair the Kremlin's economic and administrative capabilities. These

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weaknesses, however, would ~~TOP SECRET~~ and decisive effect upon the outcome of a Soviet military venture. During the early stages of war, native Soviet morale might improve somewhat with reports of spectacular victories and the prospects of booty from Western Europe. It is unlikely that the psychological weaknesses in the Soviet and Satellite structure would produce serious consequences unless the Soviet orbit were subjected to prolonged and effective aerial attack from the West, and the prospect for ultimate victory seriously diminished, or invasion of the Soviet orbit by Western forces became imminent.

Furthermore, it is extremely doubtful that the forces of resistance within the Soviet orbit would effectively assert themselves unless they received guidance and material support from the West, with tangible hope for early liberation by Western forces.

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